

# **Overcoming Resistance: Developing an Influence Strategy for the Joint Force Commander**

**A Monograph  
by  
LTC Kenneth S. Luther  
United States Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**AY 2010**

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 13-05-2010		2. REPORT TYPE SAMS Monograph		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) July 2009 – May 2010	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Overcoming Resistance: Developing an Influence Strategy for the Joint Force Commander				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth S. Luther (U.S. Army)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) 250 Gibbon Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Foreign Military Studies Office & Command and General Staff College Director, FMSO 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) FMSO / CGSC	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT It is the enemy's will to resist that is the true objective of war. Destruction of his armed forces is a means and not necessarily mandatory to achieve this objective. To save the precious resources of blood and treasure and to assure the continuance of policy, United States military commanders should focus their attention on overcoming the enemy's will to resist through effective influence operations. This monograph examines communication theory as it relates to an influence strategy and conducts a comparative research analysis of political campaign and marketing models. By comparing the major aspects of both these models, appropriate aspects of influence activities can be identified for use by the joint forces integrated into the assessment, planning and execution functions of the command. By using the proven methods of political campaigns and business marketing, the Joint Force Commander can efficiently confront the problems of contemporary conflicts and establish effective strategies for the future. This monograph makes recommendations that cover changes to how the Joint Force Commander and staff assess the environment, synchronize their current capabilities, change their operating concepts and incorporate the proven principles to overcome resistance to an idea.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Communication Theory, Strategic Communication, Strategy, Information Operations, Influence Operations, Staff organization, Command and Control, Counterinsurgency, Joint Force Operations, Full Spectrum Operations,					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: (U)			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES  80	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Stefan J. Banach COL, U.S. Army
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code) 913-758-3302

# **SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES**

## **MONOGRAPH APPROVAL**

LTC Kenneth S. Luther

Title of Monograph: Overcoming Resistance: Developing an Influence strategy  
for the Joint Force Commander

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.

Monograph Director

\_\_\_\_\_  
Drew Meyerowich, COL, IN

Monograph Reader

\_\_\_\_\_  
Stefan J. Banach, COL, IN

Director,  
School of Advanced  
Military Studies

\_\_\_\_\_  
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,  
Graduate Degree  
Programs

## **Abstract**

**OVERCOMING RESISTANCE: DEVELOPING AN INFLUENCE STRATEGY FOR THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER** by LTC Kenneth S. Luther, U.S. Army, 45 pages.

It is the enemy's will to resist that is the true objective of war. Destruction of his armed forces is a means and not necessarily mandatory to achieve this objective. To save the precious resources of blood and treasure and to assure the continuance of policy, United States military commanders should focus their attention on overcoming the enemy's will to resist through effective influence operations.

Current deficiencies in influence activities often compel the United States to resort to an inappropriate use of military force. Often this use of force is counterproductive and reinforces the negative perceptions of the United States. Instead of applying strategic communication, the Joint Force Commander should focus on the influence of foreign populations in pursuit of national security objectives and to do this the Joint Force Commander should borrow from the methods of political campaigning and business marketing. Preeminent to this concept is overcoming an audience's natural resistance to an idea. In fact, overcoming resistance is an often overlooked facet of any influence activity. All too often, the construction and execution of messaging is the central focus of influence activities, yet the conditions for the positive reception of messages has not been obtained.

The monograph conducts a practical examination of current problems of joint force influence activities and examines the term strategic communication to make the argument for the development of an influence strategy central to the theater strategy. The monograph examines communication theory as it relates to an influence strategy and conducts a comparative research analysis of political campaign and marketing models. By comparing the major aspects of both these models, appropriate aspects of influence activities can be identified for use by the joint forces integrated into the assessment, planning and execution functions of the command.

Massive reorganization efforts and substantial increases in budgetary resources are not required to make positive changes to the Joint Force Commanders efforts in strategic communication and influence. But progressive measures of engagement and adjustments to how to effectively influence are in fact required to encourage change. Additionally, a more accurate use of the conceptual terms of strategic communication and influence are also warranted. This will enable Joint Force Commanders to describe what is actually trying to be accomplished. By using the proven methods of political campaigns and business marketing, the Joint Force Commander can efficiently confront the problems of contemporary conflicts and establish effective strategies for the future.

This monograph makes recommendations that cover changes to how the Joint Force Commander and staff assess the environment, synchronize their current capabilities, change their operating concepts and incorporate the proven principles to overcome resistance to an idea. Current assessment capabilities and structures must be modified to measure effectiveness of current influence efforts. They must incorporate methods for determining progress of influence operations through the synthesis of audience behavior. Additionally, influence planning must be an essential component of the theater strategy as it is developed. This planning must be based on the Joint Force Commander and staff strategic estimate which is informed by political and marketing methods of assessment. Finally, the Joint Force Commander and staff must evaluate the performance of a message and/or action through multiple techniques that are based on the same principles as political and marketing models.

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## Introduction

Firepower cannot defeat an idea; only a better and more compelling idea can overcome its cruel adversary. When spurred to action by blind hatred and fanaticism, ignorance is mankind's greatest enemy. Ours is truly a struggle of the pen.

Colonel G. L. Lamborn<sup>1</sup>

In a criticism of the contemporary powers conduct of war in the early 19<sup>th</sup> Century, Liddell Hart wrote "The Napoleonic Fallacy."<sup>2</sup> In this essay, he described the general staffs of the great powers basing their doctrines on the Napoleonic method of "absolute war."<sup>3</sup> Moreover, he believed this fallacious doctrine "narrowed and distorted their whole conception of war." As a remedy, Liddell Hart suggested that nations "change this adverse determination." He recommended the sooner nations did this the better as it would save in lives and money and assure the "continuance of our national policy." Liddell Hart went on to state, "the aim of a nation in war is, therefore, to subdue the enemy's will to resist, with the least possible human and economic loss to itself."<sup>4</sup> Clausewitz also discussed this topic of the enemy's will to resist as he moved away from his theory of "absolute war" in the abstract sense and argued the political nature of "war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" in that "the aim is to disarm the enemy."<sup>5</sup> Mao Tsu Tung also closely associated the phenomena of politics and war as he stated "politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed."<sup>6</sup> Yet, as Sun Tzu thought, bloodshed is not always necessary. He believed the highest acumen of skill and "supreme

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<sup>1</sup> G. L. Lamborn, "Jihad of the Pen: A Practitioners Guide to Conducting Effective Influence Operations in an Insurgency" Special to the *Small Wars Journal* online at <https://smallwarsjournal.com> (accessed February 22, 2010), 2.

<sup>2</sup> "The Napoleonic Fallacy" was a subtitle of the "Moral Objective of War" published in the March 1925 issue of *Empire Review* a Journal of the British Empire. See B.H Liddell Hart, *The Liddell Hart Memoirs Volume I* (London, UK: Cassell & Company LTD, 1965).

<sup>3</sup> Based on Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984)

<sup>4</sup> Liddell Hart, *Liddell Hart Memoirs Volume I*, 138-138.

<sup>5</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Peret (Princeton, NJ, University Press), 75-77.

<sup>6</sup> Mao Tsu Tung "On Protracted War" Selected Works, Vol. II, (Peking, China: Foreign Language Press, May 1938), 152-53.

excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.”<sup>7</sup> All of these renowned military philosophers spoke of the nature of war and the importance of overcoming the will of the enemy for victory.

Indeed, it is this enemy's will to resist that is the true objective of war, destruction of his armed forces is a means and not necessarily mandatory to achieve this objective. To save the precious resources of blood and treasure that Liddell Hart believes would assure the continuance of policy, United States military commanders should focus their attention on overcoming the enemy's will to resist through effective influence operations in concert with traditional military operations and capabilities.

With this focus, commanders can potentially save a tremendous amount of resources by influencing allies and adversaries in lieu of overt military force. Yet current deficiencies in influence activities often compel the United States to resort to inappropriate uses of military force. Often this use of force is counterproductive and reinforces the negative perceptions of the United States. What will be helpful to any strategy is to learn how to incorporate the techniques of influence frequently used in political and business marketing campaigns. A close examination of these campaigns will identify appropriate methods for the military application of influence activities. These influence methods will help in a variety of ways including influencing “fence-sitters” in developing positive perceptions of the United States and may in fact obviate the need for direct military action.<sup>8</sup>

The Joint Force Commanders (JFC), especially the Geographic Combatant Commanders, are often at the leading edge of United States policy in the engagement of foreign audiences. The United States Department of Defense has recognized the importance of the JFCs communications capabilities in the last two Quadrennial Defense Reviews. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review states, “The

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<sup>7</sup> Sun-tzu, *The Art of War*, Translated by Ralph D. Sawyer (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1994), 167.

<sup>8</sup> Fence-sitters is a term used to describe the neutral population that is sitting on the proverbial fence between adversarial forces normally during an insurgency. Fence sitters was a term first used and considered the operational center of gravity by the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom 2004. See Peter Chiarelli and Patrick Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations” *Military Review July-August 2005*. [http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume3/october\\_2005/10\\_05\\_2.html](http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume3/october_2005/10_05_2.html) (accessed April 10, 2010). By influencing fence-sitters, an organization can dramatically reduce the power of an insurgent adversary. This is fundamental to population centric counterinsurgency. See David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1964), 70-86.

Department must instill communication assessments and processes into its culture, developing programs, plans, policy, information and themes to support Combatant Commanders that reflect the U.S. Government's overall strategic objectives.”<sup>9</sup> In addition, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review states, “Department of Defense will continue to improve key capabilities that support strategic communication.”<sup>10</sup> To continually improve the capabilities for the JFC as directed by the past two Quadrennial Defense Reviews, formal strategic planning, integration and synchronization processes could benefit from the experience and capabilities of communications professionals working in civilian politics and business marketing. These professionals provide an array of techniques specifically designed for the dilemmas of today's information environment which will be beneficial across the spectrum of conflict.<sup>11</sup>

The United States faces a variety of problems in its attempts to communicate with audiences in the contemporary operating environment. These problems range from the synchronization and implementation of information operations to the consistently misunderstood term of strategic communication. To alleviate some of the problems and provide clarity, it is necessary to describe what the JFCs are actually trying to accomplish. Instead of applying strategic communication, the JFC should focus on the influence of foreign populations in pursuit of national security objectives and to do this the JFC should borrow from the methods of political campaigning and business marketing. Preeminent to this concept is overcoming an audience's natural resistance to an idea.

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<sup>9</sup> The Feb 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report assesses the threats and challenges that the nation faces and re-balances the Department of Defense strategies, capabilities and forces to address today's conflicts and tomorrow's threats. The Quadrennial defense review specifically identified strategic communication as one of five specific areas of emphasis including department institutional reform and governance, irregular warfare, building partnership capacity, strategic communication and intelligence. See the US DOD *Quadrennial Defense review Report*, February 2006 at <http://www.defense.gov/QDR/> (accessed November 30, 2009), 92.

<sup>10</sup> The Feb 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report assesses that the Department of Defense must strengthen key supporting capabilities for strategic communication principally in support of counterinsurgency, stability and counterterrorism operations. See the US DOD *Quadrennial Defense review Report*, February 2010 at <http://www.defense.gov/QDR/> (accessed February 14, 2010), 20-26.

<sup>11</sup> The spectrum of conflict goes from stable peace through insurgency to general war. Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2008), 2-1.



Overcoming resistance is an often overlooked facet of any influence activity.<sup>12</sup> All too often, the construction and execution of messaging is the central focus of influence activities, yet the conditions for the positive reception of messages has not been obtained. Fundamental to the process of overcoming resistance is the integration of appropriate methods of assessment and the measured presentation of ideas to audiences. As part of this, the close examination of the concept of strategic communication, the information environment, communications theory and existing influence models is required.

Therefore, this monograph discusses current problems in communications, examines the term strategic communication and recommends the JFCs focus on the development of an influence strategy as an alternative. As a fundamental part of this influence strategy, practitioners must pay close attention to overcoming the resistance of targeted audiences. By comparing the major aspects of both political campaign and marketing models, appropriate aspects of influence activities can be identified for use by the joint forces. The last section offers recommendations to JFCs for the development and implementation of an influence strategy central to any strategy. All recommendations will use an acceptable evaluative criteria schema that will only suggest realistic changes to current operational methods.

## **Contemporary Problems in Communication**

In a paper published on Small Wars Journal discussing effective influence operations in an insurgency, Colonel G. L. Lamborn has identified four distinct problems with the United States current attempts to influence audiences in Afghanistan.<sup>13</sup> The first fatal failure of information operations practitioners is the “failure to thoroughly analyze each and every target audience in the area of operations.” Colonel Lamborne believes that the absence of an effective assessment of the environment,

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<sup>12</sup> Studies of persuasion in psychology, communication, rhetoric, political science and marketing may indicate organizations overlooking the importance of resistance. See Eric S. Knowles, and Jay A. Linn, “The Importance of Resistance to Persuasion” In *Resistance and Persuasion*, ed. Eric S. Knowles and Jay A. Linn (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, 2003), 8.

<sup>13</sup> Small Wars Journal is a leading online community that “facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field.” <http://smallwarsjournal.com/> (accessed February 27, 2010).

the United States produces products for distribution that are not only often irrelevant to the needs of the population and counterproductive as they are culturally inappropriate. The second flaw Colonel Lamborn identifies is the use of culturally ineffective themes originating from western methods of communications and advertising. This usually results in the rejection of the message because of its origin emanating from the United States. As Colonel Lamborn states, “There is a credibility problem.” The third flaw is that we only project what we want in our messaging as opposed to accounting for what the local population wants. The assumption is that if the United States just tells people what they want, then they will comply with our wishes. The final flaw is the “failure to integrate each and every message and action into one coherent, fully orchestrated propaganda campaign.” He believes that the current effort is piecemeal and spasmodic.<sup>14</sup> All of these problems are indicative of an overall misunderstanding of communication and messaging. These troubles are also prevalent with the concept of strategic communication.

### **The Problem with Strategic Communication**

The United States Government defines the term “strategic communication” in a variety of ways with a considerable amount of variation. The range of meanings and intent of the term causes confusion and occasional misapplication. Christopher Paul, a behavioral and social scientist at the Research and Development Corporation, argues the term is vague and simply suggests we should “say what we mean.” If strategic communication does not adequately describe what we are trying to do, we should use different terminology.<sup>15</sup> The following is a review of some of the major inconsistencies with the term “strategic communication.”

There is an overall frustration with the term vocalized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael G. Mullen:

We get too hung up on that word, *strategic*. If we’ve learned nothing else these past 8 years, it should be that the lines between strategic, operational, and tactical are blurred beyond distinction.

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<sup>14</sup> G. L. Lamborn, “Jihad of the Pen: A Practitioners Guide to Conducting Effective Influence Operations in an Insurgency”, 16.

<sup>15</sup> Christopher Paul suggests you should be clear and say what you intend when using the term. See Christopher Paul, “Strategic Communication is Vague: Say What You Mean” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 56 (1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2009), 10-11.

This is particularly true in the world of communication, where videos and images plastered on the Web—or even the idea of their being so posted—can and often do drive national security decision making.<sup>16</sup>

This frustration begins with the strategic communication concept suffering from ambiguity that clouds the pursuit of national objectives. By one interpretation, Jeffery Jones, a former director for strategic communications on the National Security Council, believes strategic communications is:

The synchronized coordination of statecraft, public affairs, public diplomacy, military information operations, and other activities, reinforced by political, economic, military and other actions, to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives.<sup>17</sup>

This plural definition of strategic communication takes an ambiguous stance. The definition groups a number of actions as activities, including major aspects of strategic communications as a generalized category. It only looks at the coordination of the strategic communications tools and functions to advance foreign policy objectives and does not address domestic audience engagement. If the intent is to “advance U.S. foreign policy interests”, can it be interpreted as an attempt to influence foreign audiences toward support for U.S. policy and regional objectives? If that is the case, why not just say influence?

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) provides a more detailed definition of strategic communication in *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*:

Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.<sup>18</sup>

The DOD definition expands upon the definition provided by Jeffery Jones and establishes an understanding that includes all of the instruments of national power.<sup>19</sup> Importantly, the DOD definition highlights the necessity to “understand and engage key audiences” but does not delineate between the use

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<sup>16</sup> Admiral Mike Mullen “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 55 (4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2009), 2.

<sup>17</sup> Jeffery Jones “Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 39 (4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2005), 110.

<sup>18</sup> Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 12 April 2001).

<sup>19</sup> According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms the instruments of national power can be defined as: All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military.

of strategic communication as focused on domestic engagement or as an aspect of foreign policy. Also, it only speaks to the engagement of key audiences “to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives.” But is the term engagement adequately describing what it is that the JFC is trying to do? It may be that engagement falls short of the intent which is to influence these key audiences.

A more definitive example of the strategic communication definition is offered by the 2008 report from the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication:

Strategic communication differs from public relations and public affairs. It includes but goes beyond media affairs and short-term news streams to focus on mid-range and long-term objectives that require multi-disciplinary capabilities, engagement in a dialogue of ideas, and durable partnerships with civil society organizations. As such, strategic communication is more “long-term strategic.” Public affairs is more “short-term tactical.” Coordination between them is vital and facilitated in the Department of Defense (DOD) through development of an Integrated Strategic Communication Plan.<sup>20</sup>

The Defense Science Board definition establishes strategic communication in more holistic context and looks at the integration of execution, planning and assessments. This definition also highlights the concept of the “engagement in a dialogue of ideas” as well as establishing “durable partnerships.” This definition is relevant for a JFC through the “development of an integrated Strategic Communication Plan.” But, as in the previous definitions, this Defense Science Board does not delineate the purpose for these engagements and establishment of these durable partnerships. Is it to influence them? This definition does add some value to the establishment of an integrated plan that can form the basis of a JFC influence strategy. If the intent is to perform a variety of actions including engagement and establishing partnerships, then it may be that the term “strategic communication” should not be used to define the application of the concept. The diversity of definitions and the failure to get at the crux of the issue, which is to influence key audiences “to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives” may be the problem. With

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<sup>20</sup> Defense Science Board “The Report of the Defense Science Board: Task Force on Strategic Communication” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2008), 1-2.

this, the underlying assumption is that if one wishes to influence then one must implicitly understand and engage audiences. The following two reasons support this assertion.

First, the number of diverse definitions that have permeated military professional literature have caused a great deal of ambiguity in the understanding of the concept. Second, the baggage that comes with the term strategic as explained by Admiral Mullin. He believes the lines between the three levels of war (strategic, operational and tactical) have blurred and it is difficult to distinguish what is strategic and what is not. Every possible action that is relayed in the information environment can have strategic consequences yet everything cannot be strategic, therefore to circumvent misuse of terms it should at least be avoided if not diminished and replaced with appropriate terms dependant what is being described.

Richard Halloran, a foreign and military correspondent for the *New York Times* describes the difficulty with the strategic communication concept. He observes that there are four general assumptions. First, and as discussed previously, there is no agreed upon definition of the term.<sup>21</sup> Second and as most observers agree, the concept of strategic communication is an important, if not essential, component of United States foreign and national security policy.<sup>22</sup> In most cases the term “strategic communication” is used to depict this essential component although there are other labels that have been used to describe this informational approach.<sup>23</sup> The third general assumption is there are a number of observers that believe “strategic communication” is broken. This includes criticism that an overall strategy for strategic communication is lacking through its disconnection between strategic “ways” and “means” towards the

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<sup>21</sup> Through his statement “...the nation’s political and military leaders have yet to agree upon on what they mean by strategic communication.” Richard Halloran “Strategic Communication” *Parameters* (Autumn 2007), 5.

<sup>22</sup> Proponents of Strategic Communication include Mari K. Eder, “Toward Strategic Communication” *Military Review*, (July/August 2007), Richard Jostine, “Strategic Communication: Key Enabler for Elements of National Power” *IO Sphere*, (Summer 2006) and the Defense Science Board “Task Force on Strategic Communication 2008” Issue 47, (4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2007); and Dennis M. Murphy “The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s)” *IO Sphere*, (Winter 2008).

<sup>23</sup> In some cases the synonymous term is public diplomacy, often associated with actions and messages of the United States Department of State. Public Diplomacy is not a subset of strategic communication but a more encompassing term describing all messaging from a government that is not private or government to government.

common “ends”.<sup>24</sup> The final assumption is the suggestion that to repair strategic communication, one must have better interagency coordination. Jeffery Jones believes a national communications strategy should be a subset of the National Security Strategy. It should be coequal and synchronized with the political strategy, economic and military strategies from the executive branches of government.<sup>25</sup>

Realistically, the term strategic communication will not be immediately deleted from doctrinal lexicon. As a term, it has permeated professional literature in both the Department of Defense and the Department of State.<sup>26</sup> Strategic communication has also become a component for graduate study at civilian universities.<sup>27</sup> It has become in vogue for organizations to use and name themselves as coordinators for strategic communications yet this is also adding to the confusion and ambiguity described above.

The use of the term strategic communication has brought a great deal attention from the United States national security community. This attention, including from the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Defense Science Board, does come with benefits including recommendations for increased funding and resources but it is important for the JFC to be concise in describing what they are trying to accomplish. Therefore, although strategic communication suffers from multiple and occasionally inadequate definitions, it will continue to be used in a variety of contexts in the near future but overtime should be replaced with more precise terminology, specifically with the term influence. An effective influence strategy will integrate the theoretical elements of persuasion and communication into a powerful combination. The JFC must synchronize these capabilities into an overall strategy to increase

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<sup>24</sup> Dennis Murphy believes that Strategic Communication “means” are important capabilities and need to be integrated into the planning process. See Dennis Murphy “The Trouble with Strategic Communication (s)” *IO Sphere*, (Winter 2008).

<sup>25</sup> Jeffery Jones “Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States”, 108.

<sup>26</sup> For in depth discussions of public diplomacy, strategic communication and global engagement see Matt Armstrong’s blog <http://mountainrunner.us/index.html> (accessed February 27, 2010).

<sup>27</sup> The University of Missouri School of Journalism offers undergraduate and graduate programs in Strategic Communication. See online descriptions at <http://journalism.missouri.edu/graduate/masters/two-year-strategic.html> (accessed Feb 22, 2010).

the probability of successful operational effectiveness. The JFC must also be mindful that use of the term influence does not come without hazards.

Just after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense created the Office of Strategic Influence in an attempt to combat the ideology of enemies in the Global War on Terror. The purpose of the organization was to influence foreign audiences in support of United States policy objectives yet the reception of the organization by the American public was less than enthusiastic. Eventually, the newly formed office was closed down after multiple news organizations reported the office would be spreading disinformation to the overseas press including to some of the United States closest allies in Western Europe.<sup>28</sup> This failure to create an organization to influence foreign audiences provides an example of the hazards of misunderstanding of language and intent. This is also why the term strategic communication has been used but it is not an appropriate term as it is vague and misleading. In fact, J. Michael Waller, a professor of International Communication at the Institute of World Politics, believes that “strategic communication is strategic influence. We mustn’t be ashamed of the concept. It’s time to embrace it.”<sup>29</sup> Therefore, when it comes to the implementation of strategy, JFCs should focus on influencing audiences as a major conceptual component of strategy. To avoid the missteps of the Office of Strategic Influence will be addressed in the section discussing communications theory.

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<sup>28</sup> For an initial report of the Office of Strategic Influence and speculation of its future purpose see James Dao and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon readies Efforts to Sway Sentiments Abroad” The New York Times online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/19/international/19PENT.html?ex=1122782400&en=0d417d42224e7b54&ei=5070&pagewanted=print> (accessed March 7, 2010). For a report after the Office of Strategic Influence was closed see “Pentagon Closes Down Controversial Office” CNN.com/US online at <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/02/26/defense.office/> (accessed March 7, 2010).

<sup>29</sup> J. Michael Waller, “Getting Serious About Strategic Influence” The Journal of International Security Affairs (Fall 2009, Number 17) online at <http://www.securityaffairs.org/> (accessed March 7, 2010).

## Implementing an Influence Strategy

America cannot solve the most pressing problems on our own, and the world cannot solve them without America. We must use what has been called 'smart power', the full range of tools at our disposal.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton<sup>30</sup>

Properly defined, soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuasion and positive attraction.

Joseph S. Nye Jr.<sup>31</sup>

The development of an influence strategy is problematic because there is no current joint or service specific doctrinal definition of influence operations. Influence itself can be defined as “the act or power of producing an effect without apparent exertion of force or direct exercise of command.”<sup>32</sup> The following discussion highlights essential operational activities and theoretical applications in developing an influence strategy for a JFC. Furthermore, in any construction of an influence strategy there are fundamental criteria that will limit implementation and must be accounted for. These criteria will be applied to the implementation of an influence strategy utilizing the tenants of political campaign and business marketing models.

A 2009 RAND study of influence operations introduces a definition of the concept in lieu of an accepted joint or Army definition of the term. It states:

Influence operations are the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in peacetime, crises, conflict, and postconflict to foster attitudes, behaviors, or decisions by foreign target audiences that further U.S. interests and objectives.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> As quoted in an address to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during her confirmation hearing on January 13, 2009. <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jWv-K5miLGEKM3E3EPFbyvDCcVug> (accessed on March 9, 2010)

<sup>31</sup> Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 4, 2010. <http://mountainrunner.us/2010/03/nye.html> (accessed March 9, 2010)

<sup>32</sup> Merriam-Webster Dictionary online. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/influence> (accessed January 28, 2010).

<sup>33</sup> Note this definition resembles the DOD definition of Strategic Communication. See Eric V. Larson, Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H Schwartz, Quantic Cathryn Thurston, *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities* (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 2.



This definition lays the foundation for the implementation of an influence strategy that allows for a staff to coordinate, integrate and synchronize specific functions along the spectrum of conflict. In fact, conducting influence using this definition may be a very beneficial strategy of international intervention in troubled states by conducting conflict transformation in an attempt to establish a viable peace.<sup>34</sup>

Two criteria for an evaluation of influence strategies emanate from the definition of influence operations. The first is the amount of effort it takes for a staff to coordinate, integrate or synchronize an influence strategy. Overly esoteric strategies based on intricate theoretical concepts will make it difficult for a joint force staff to plan, prepare, execute and assess influence operations. On the other hand, a simplistic staff process to coordinate, integrate and synchronize a strategy will also be problematic. This is due to the complicated nature of the information environment. Therefore, a coherent level of pragmatism should be applied to the implementation of any influence strategy. The second focuses on the implementation of an influence strategy. This implementation must have processes that are applicable to foreign audiences and will counter resistance to ideas. A strategy that is culturally analogous may not have an effect on culturally diverse audiences and in fact may become counter-productive.

There are two additional criteria that will be critical in the evaluation of existing influence endeavors. The first is any influence strategy that requires a significant increase in personnel or resource requirements for planning, preparing, executing and conducting assessments is also problematic. Just like any other organization, there is a finite amount of personnel and resources to accomplish any task. The construction of a new strategy or modification of an existing strategy that requires a significant increase in personnel or resource requirements including funding may be unfeasible. The final criteria include the avoidance of a dramatic reorganization of the JFC staff structure and/or processes. Any requirement that requires a JFC to significantly change its existing organization is also untenable.

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<sup>34</sup> Conflict transformation deals with the continuation of violent internal struggle for power by means other than open warfare. The transformation deals with the means and motivations for violent conflict and develops better peaceful alternatives for competing actors in pursuit of political and economic goals. Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic and Leonard R. Hawley, *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation* (Washington, D.C: The Endowment for the United States Institute for Peace, 2005), 14.

The four evaluative criteria discussed above including the pragmatic application of theory, the applicability to foreign audiences to counter resistance, the requirement to utilize equivalent resources to current operations, and the avoidance of dramatic organizational changes will be used to examine political campaign and business marketing models. Budgetary and resource constraints for the JFC principally drive these evaluative criteria. Unrealistic recommendations for the JFC that have dramatic consequences to educational requirements, budget, resource and organization will not be particularly helpful. By placing the JFC and its implementation of any influence strategy in context and describing some fundamentals of the information environment that are increasing in precedence in 21<sup>st</sup> century conflict, a better appreciation for the requirements can be gained.

### **The changing nature of the information environment**

The information environment, which any influence strategy must account for is not static, in fact it is in a constant state of flux. In an attempt to describe the environment, United States military joint doctrine defines it as including “the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.”<sup>35</sup> The following discussion will focus on the important factors of the information environment that are pertinent to this monograph.<sup>36</sup> All of these factors are adding to and changing the complex nature of the environment. In this evolving environment, it is important to think of communication as more than just the characteristics of verbal communication. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullin has identified other aspects that are just as important.

The other pieces of communications identified by Admiral Mullin include the linkage of physical action and communication. He believes “the essence of good communication” is “having the right intent

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<sup>35</sup> Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006).

<sup>36</sup> For an in depth discussion of the contemporary information environment including the likely scientific and technological advancements including quantum computers, improved sensors, robotics, nanotechnology and improved human sciences, refer to both the Department of Defense, *2008 Joint Operating Environment* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 25 November, 2008) and the Department of the Army, *The Army Capstone Concept* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 21 December 2009) 9-13.

up front and having our actions speak for themselves”. Admiral Mullin calls this the “say-do gap.” The more actions do not match messages, the harder it will be for JFCs to have positive influence.<sup>37</sup> It is becoming easier for actors to match messages to actions principally enabled by the transparency of today’s cyber medium. In effect, this cyber medium is becoming an instrumental aspect of all military operations.<sup>38</sup>

According to Nik Gowing of the University of Oxford, not only is the cyber environment becoming the communication medium of choice but it is dramatically shifting power away from the traditional political and corporate power brokers. The cyber medium is demonstrating the ability to shape public perception via the masses of private global citizens that are virtually tuned in. These enabled masses have created “a new capacity for scrutiny and accountability way beyond the assumed power and influence of the traditional media.”<sup>39</sup> Understanding the future of advancements in technology and their implications upon traditional sources of power in shaping perception now becomes much more important especially in terms of ensuring actions are matched to words.

The effects of the rapid advancements of information technology are twofold. The first effect is the significant advancement of the capabilities of the United States Department of Defense and joint military forces. Increased computing power and connectivity will have a direct positive effect upon joint military force operations. The second effect is the increasing availability of the technological advances to the adversaries of the United States. Even now, the enemies of the United States are taking advantage of

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<sup>37</sup> Michael G. Mullin, “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basic”, 2-4. Examples of this include the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe. The “Say-do” gap was a term originally used to describe business and corporate leaders saying something yet doing another which effects quality, service, speed, cost control, innovation and productivity. See Jim Schaffer, *The Leadership Solution*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000) 131.

<sup>38</sup> The increasing impact of the cyber medium on military thinking and operations is discussed in detail in Timothy Thomas, *Cyber Silhouettes: Shadows Over Information Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2005)

<sup>39</sup> There are two reasons for the capabilities of the enabled masses; first technology advancements have dramatically shortened news and information cycles to minutes and the vast proliferation of “information doers” who have expanded the definition of media. These trends have been observed and analyzed in Nik Gowing, “Skyful of Lies and Black Swans: The New Tyranny of Shifting Information Power in Crises” Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (Oxford, England: University of Oxford Press 2009).

the computer networks and the power of information technology to influence the perception of a global audience as well as execute disruptive cyber terrorism.<sup>40</sup>

Taking this brief discussion of the information environment, the key aspects discussed above will impact changes a JFC and staff needs to make to organization, development and implementation of its influence strategy in four ways. First, a joint force staff must be capable of accounting for the wide variety of actors and mediums communicating in the information environment. Second, the JFC must understand the linkage of its actions and communications. Third, the joint force staff must demonstrate the ability to operate in an increasingly cyber medium and finally the JFC and staff must understand and account for the continual increase and diversification of information technology, both upon themselves as well as upon their adversaries. The next important aspect for the JFC to integrate is the implications of communications theory into the theater strategy.

### **Theater Influence Strategy**

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, regional problems have emerged as the preeminent threat to the interests of the United States. These regional problems are principally addressed by the JFCs in the form of theater development strategies and theater campaign plans. In the development of a theater strategy, the JFCs principally use the National Security Strategy and its supporting documents that cover the strategic direction, the national strategic estimate and the strategic concepts of the United States of America. One of the documents that inform the JFCs theater development strategy and campaign plan is the National Military Strategy.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Department of Defense, *2008 Joint Operating Concept* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 25 November 2008).

<sup>41</sup> Clarence J., Bouchat, "An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security". The other major documents and resources that inform the Theater Development Strategies and Campaign plans include the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Strategic Planning Guidance, Contingency Planning Guidance, Security Cooperation Guidance, Joint strategy Review, Joint strategic Capabilities Plan as well as a other national guidance.

The National Military Strategy describes “the ways and means to protect the United States, prevent conflict and surprise attack and prevail against adversaries who threaten our homeland.”<sup>42</sup> To achieve the JFCs strategic objectives, a full integration of the instruments of national power including “the cooperation and participation of friends and allies and the support of the American people” is proving to be essential.<sup>43</sup> The JFCs theater strategy and campaign plans must use influence to gain this cooperation with friends and allies and to counter our adversaries. Many believe the importance of this influence to be expanding in scope and importance.<sup>44</sup> In fact, the closest allies of the United States are suggesting “the need to move influence from the periphery of the command’s thinking to its very epicenter.”<sup>45</sup> This centrally focused influence strategy can be constructed using several preexisting capabilities of the JFC and staff that have traditionally supported strategic communication. Each capability adds to the overall JFCs theater security strategy and must be synchronized throughout the organization to achieve optimal effects.<sup>46</sup> The influence strategy also can benefit from theory and it is necessary at this juncture to discuss the important aspects of communications theory.

## **Communications Theory**

To properly synchronize each of the traditional strategic communication capabilities with all operations and activities of the joint force staff it is necessary to discuss the foundations of communication theory. To influence, one must communicate effectively for a given purpose. The “message influence model” is the traditional method of communication currently being utilized by many

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<sup>42</sup> Department of Defense. “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), iv.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> For early arguments (1996) that support the increasing importance of information as part of the instruments of national power see Hans Binnendijk, and Patrik L. Clawson, *Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of National Power* (Washington, D.C: National Defense University Press 1996).

<sup>45</sup> This is the central thesis of Andrew Mackay, and Steve Tatham, “Behavioral Conflict: From General to Strategic Corporal: Complexity, Adaptation and Influence,” *The Shrivenham Papers, Number 9 Defence Academy of The United Kingdom* (Shrivenham, UK: Cranfield Studios, 2009).

<sup>46</sup> The traditional and preexisting capabilities of a GCC in support of Strategic Communications include the information operations, civil-military operations, public affairs, defense support to public diplomacy, and visual information support. See *Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy*, US Joint Forces Command (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 27 October 2009) Annex B.

aspects of communications systems. In this model one source or person possessing information uses a message and delivers it through a variety of means, in an attempt to affect another source. It is much like sending a letter in the mail or an advertisement on television. It can have additional aspects by adding feedback and assessment loops, also known in military lexicon as measuring performance and effectiveness. The feedback and assessment will in turn refine meaning and develop a more convincing message or argument.<sup>47</sup>

The linear approach inherent within the “message influence model” is problematic for an influence strategy. This model depends on the assumption that the message sent will be the message received. This is based on closed system methodology and analysis.<sup>48</sup> This fundamental flaw is derived from not fully recognizing the multiple stimuli and mismatched cultural perceptions that are inherent in the open system of the information environment. Additionally, the receiver’s resistance to messages also is challenging for this process. The message influence model assumes that this environment can be understood and the message can be successful if it is continually modified through an assessment feedback loop. It is possible that the message influence model can influence a targeted audience but only if the audiences are not resisting the message. These messages may be relatively ineffective because they are competing with other messages in the information environment that a JFC cannot control.

The Arizona State University Consortium on Strategic Communication makes this argument as they believe first one must understand the system dynamics at work and then one can construct a strategic communication plan to “disrupt and perturb existing systems such that they can begin to organize around new meaning-making frameworks.”<sup>49</sup> Drawing from social systems theory developed by German

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<sup>47</sup> The message influence model is based on a mathematical model of language, communication and meaning developed by Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver in *The Mathematical Theory of Communication* (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1963).

<sup>48</sup> A closed system is a system or state of being isolated from its surrounding environment.

<sup>49</sup> “Some ask “How can we construct a more persuasive message?” But they should be asking “what kind of reality has this particular system [that we are trying to influence] constructed for itself?” from Steven Corman, Angela Trethewey, and Bud Goodall “A 21<sup>st</sup> Century Model for Communication in the Global War of Ideas: From Simplistic Influence to Pragmatic Complexity” <http://comops.org/publications.php> (accessed December 7, 2009), 9.

Sociologist Niklas Luhmann, they developed what is known as the “Pragmatic Complexity Model”.<sup>50</sup> This model is based on three implications. First, “the system has effects of its own that can thwart the best intentions of its members.” A message sent and received to an intended audience does not always create the desired effects. In some cases, messages create opposite reactions that were impossible to predict. Partially due to a systems interpretation of meaning, a message cannot simply be transferred to an intended audience with a different cultural perspective because messages are normally resisted by the intended audience based on their cultural lens. Also, if the message is assimilated, it will often be misinterpreted. The second implication is communication should not be looked at in the old model of trying to influence an audience to act in a certain way or to effect behavioral change. In the case of the “Pragmatic Complexity Model” framework, it is to “to perturb the system and overcome its tendency to interpret and attribute in the standard ways.” These standard ways, such as the message influence model, are fraught with the misinterpretation highlighted above. The third and final implication due to the phenomena of double contingency in that failure is a normal condition.<sup>51</sup> Given the number of variables that change the message, it is unlikely that the receiver will understand the meaning. This is especially true when received by a different cultural perspective.<sup>52</sup>

With the three implications listed above, a conclusion may be that the traditional message influence modeled communication strategy can be a very risky enterprise wrought with misperception and misunderstanding. More messaging is not necessarily better which may be counterintuitive to those who base the tenants of a communication strategy on the techniques of information saturation of an audience.

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<sup>50</sup> Luhmann theories concentrate three topics which are interconnected throughout his entire work including systems theory as a societal theory, communications theory and evolution theory. See Niklas Luhmann, *Social System*, translated by John Bednarz with Dirk Baecker (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA: 1984).

<sup>51</sup> Niklas Luhmann, *Social System*. The problem of double contingency is the idea that every communication must take into account the way that it is received, and the speaker knows that whatever he says will be received in light of the receivers estimation of the speaker. The less the speaker and receiver know about each other, the less likely they will understand each other. This is why Niklas Luhmann believes social systems based on communications solves this problem and why cross cultural communication is so difficult.

<sup>52</sup> From Steven Corman, Angela Trethewey, and Bud Goodall “A 21<sup>st</sup> Century Model for Communication in the Global War of Ideas: From Simplistic Influence to Pragmatic Complexity”, 10-11.

To overcome these difficulties of the “message influence model”, the Arizona State Consortium for Strategic Communication suggests four principles that will aid in an influence strategy.<sup>53</sup>

The first principle is to “deemphasize control and embrace complexity.” The JFC has no ability to control the variety of messages emanating from the massed subcultures of Islam and the West including, moderates, extremists, liberals and conservative on both sides. As mentioned before, adversaries are suffering the same problems as the JFCs and there will be success and failure in all camps. The JFCs should seek an asymmetric advantage which in a number of cases is telling the truth.<sup>54</sup> In fact, countering adversarial propaganda with truthful information has proven to be an effective approach.<sup>55</sup>

The second principle is to replace repetition with variation. Using a few simple themes in a veritable drumbeat of messaging is not likely to work in the global information environment. The JFC may want to use “an evolutionary approach to sensemaking in the complex system, involving steps of variation, selection and retention.” In this case, JFC communications organizations would continually experiment and adapt using variations of message themes to discover positive effects.<sup>56</sup>

The third principle is to plan for disruptive moves or major variations in a system that would significantly change perceptions and public opinion. A good example of this is the change in the United States executive administration from President Bush to President Obama. This change considerably altered the global public opinion and perception of the United States. Major disruptions to the system like this should be planned for and, if possible, looked at as an advantageous opportunity. A future possibility of this type of major variation could include diplomatic breakthroughs such as in an Israel-Palestine dispute or an effective cure for the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 11.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, 12.

<sup>55</sup> Empirical evidence supports response to rumors, especially those that threaten an organizations legitimacy is considered essential. See Christopher Paul, “Social-Science Foundations for Strategic Communication” in *Social Science for Counterterrorism*, eds Paul K Davis and Kim Cragin (Arlington VA: RAND Corporation, 2009).

<sup>56</sup> Karl E. Weick., *The Social Psychology of Organizing* (New York; NY: McGraw-Hill Publishers, 1978).

<sup>57</sup> , Steven Corman, Angela Trethewey, and Bud Goodall “A 21<sup>st</sup> Century Model for Communication in the Global War of Ideas: From Simplistic Influence to Pragmatic Complexity”13.



The final principle is that failure will happen and it should be planned for. Due to the double contingency nature of the system, the inability to predict the effects of messages, “strategic communicators should think less in terms of grand strategy and more in terms of contingency planning.”<sup>58</sup> Organizations should continually develop contingencies for when messaging goes wrong. These contingencies should be an integral part of the planning conducted by the joint force crises action teams. In addition, the United States closest allies are also putting a lot of thought to communicating in the contemporary information environment.

Commander Tatham McPhil of the Advanced Research and Assessment Group at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom believes, “Conveying information messages to specific audiences, in order to affect behavioral change for specific policy objectives, may well prove more decisive in future battles than the placement of bullets and bombs upon a target.” Commander McPhil also agrees with the pragmatic complexity model for communication and believes conveying messages with the simplistic message influence model may not be enough in a complex environment. To truly affect behavioral change in a complex environment, interaction may be what sets communicating effectively apart from dysfunctional and irrelevant communications campaigns based on models from the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>59</sup> In fact, a number of examples of the message influence model techniques have emanated from the Cold War.

A traditional technique of the United States communication apparatus aimed at foreign audiences is through programs such as Voice of America.<sup>60</sup> The Voice of America was used for white propaganda directed against Communist ideology during the Cold War.<sup>61</sup> The technique of taking the moral high

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid, 14.

<sup>59</sup> S.A. Tatham-McPhil, “Strategic Communication: A Primer” [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/documents/DAUKARAG08\(28\)Strategic%20Communication.pdf](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/documents/DAUKARAG08(28)Strategic%20Communication.pdf) (accessed December 7, 2009), 12.

<sup>60</sup> The Voice of America is the external radio and television broadcasting network service of the United States network. The official US government English website of Voice of America can be found at <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/> (accessed December 7, 2009).

<sup>61</sup> White propaganda is propaganda that truthfully states its origin. Voice of America was initially used in World War II by the Office of War Information to counter Nazi propaganda in support of the war effort. Post World War II

ground using a radio broadcast such as the Voice of America may not dramatically change foreign public opinion especially those with an opposing ideology. A more relevant strategy is to convince legitimate foreign governments to tell their own people why they should change.<sup>62</sup> The JFC is in a very influential position to do this through its military and diplomatic connections with all of the host nations within its geographical responsibilities.

In sum, the traditional aspects of communications models such as the “message influence model” may not be enough. For the JFC to be effective, they must apply principles from the “Pragmatic Complexity Model” for an effective influence strategy. The first is placing an emphasis on telling the truth, although deceptive information operations have their place in military activity, the transparency of the internet is forcing accountability. Certainly, propaganda should steer away from overt lies and its techniques should be applied to highlighting the positive. The JFC should establish variation of its messaging as opposed to mass repetition. The joint force planners should continually plan “branches and sequels” to their campaigns even for major variations in the system.<sup>63</sup> The joint force planners should also plan contingencies for influence failures and misdeeds. The JFC’s influence strategy may find it beneficial to focus communication efforts on host nation government leaders in lieu of the population themselves. Working by, with and through the government may help a JFC overcome cultural barriers and lenses. To accomplish this, specific methods of rhetoric and persuasion may be beneficial to any JFCs influence strategy, foremost is overcoming the initial resistance to any ideas.

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it was used extensively against communism. See Osgood, Kenneth., *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 2006).

<sup>62</sup> Empirical studies indicate more success in communication if culturally similar messengers are used to interface with the culturally different audience. See Christopher Paul, “Social-Science Foundations for Strategic Communication”.

<sup>63</sup> A *branch* is a contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the basic plan or course of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of the force to aid success of the current operation, based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions. *Sequels* are operations that follow the current operation. They are future operations that anticipate the possible outcomes success, failure, or stalemate of the current operations. See *Field Manual 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 1-17.

## Overcoming Resistance

The key aspect to an effective influence strategy is overcoming resistance. Indeed, resistance can be considered the antithesis of influence. If one can overcome resistance, then it makes influence a much more tenable strategy. Dr. Eric Knowles, a professor in social and personality psychology at the University of Arkansas, developed a method of influence called an “Omega Strategy”. It is a method that attempts to decrease the negative features of an alternative to what an individual or group is currently experiencing. The fundamental tenant of this strategy is that of individual or group resistance to ideas. Dr. Knowles’ “Omega Strategy” of persuasion is aimed directly at reducing the resistances to the idea not through selling the alternative but by decreasing the negative factors of the alternative.<sup>64</sup>

Resistance to an idea comes in three forms including reactance, skepticism and inertia. Reactance can be explained as the feeling people get when they believe their freedom of choice is being threatened; this in turn causes them to perform a threatened behavioral pattern in defense of their freedom of choice often in direct contrast to what caused the feeling of reactance.<sup>65</sup> This is especially prevalent from a different cultural perspective when Western culture bombards them with alien images of Hollywood and religion. Specifically, Islamic populations can be extremely reactant due to the holistic nature of the Islamic religion. An organization can reduce reactance by not asking as much from a culture and minimizing any requirements that the population may perceive it has to give.

Another method is to “depersonalize the request” which can be much like a JFC working through other already established and culturally similar organizations to achieve its objectives.<sup>66</sup> The JFCs have many opportunities to do this through already established theater security engagement programs. As an

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<sup>64</sup> According to Eric Knowles and Dan Riner, there are two ways to persuade people to accept an alternative. One is much like salesmanship by increasing the attractive factors of the alternative and the other is decreasing the negative features of the alternative. See Eric Knowles and Dan Riner, “Omega Approaches to Persuasion: Overcoming Resistance” *The Science of Social Influence: Advanced and Future Progress*, ed Anthony R. Pratkanis (Psychology Press, New York, NY: 2007).

<sup>65</sup> For an explanation of the psychological aspects of reactance see J. W. Brehm, *A theory of psychological reactance*, (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1966).

<sup>66</sup> Eric Knowles and Dan Riner, “Omega Approaches to Persuasion: Overcoming Resistance”, 149.

example the United States Africa Command commander can work through the African Union, the United Nations Economic Commission on Africa, and the Economic Community of West African States. These are prime examples that put an African face on the achievement of the United States Africa Command commander's strategic objectives without him being directly involved. Any attempt to work by, with and through another organization is likely to produce greater results than unilateral messaging.

There are also methods that have been empirically proven to not work well. Counter-arguing resistance with rhetoric can often turn out to be counterproductive. Counter-arguing can often be confrontational which in turn just creates stronger reactance. A better method for using rhetoric may be using the techniques of invitational rhetoric but a command may have to be prepared to give up enough ground in order to achieve results.<sup>67</sup> It is suggested that "communication is persuasive when there is a reciprocal process of exchanging information and developing a shared meaning."<sup>68</sup> Therefore and as Admiral Mullin believes, listening to and developing a shared understanding with foreign nations and audiences is the way forward.

Another risky method is distracting an audience's resistance to an idea with other unrelated information. This is much like a traditional psychological deception operation utilized in military operations. Unlike traditional warfare, in communications, this approach is unlikely to be successful. The complexities of the information environment combined with the transparency of the internet may cause a deliberately created distraction to be counterproductive. With the enabled masses of public opinion, distracting audiences will be difficult to control.

The most effective "omega strategy" to deal with counter-resistance is to provide a guarantee. Matched with physical action such as a troop deployment, redeployment or similar logistics operations, a

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<sup>67</sup> Invitational Rhetoric can be defined as an invitation to understanding as a means to create a relationship rooted in equality, immanent value and self-determination. It argues that its purpose is to offer an invitation to understanding and that its communicative modes are the offering of perspectives and the creation of the external conditions of safety, value, and freedom. S. K. Foss., and K. A. Griffen., "Beyond Persuasion: A proposal for Invitational Rhetoric" *Communications Monographs* 62 (New York, NY: Routledge, 1995).

<sup>68</sup> Credibility is achieved when both parties spend as much time on negotiating and learning as they do on delivering the solution, outcome, or preferred belief from Frank Barrett and Theodore Sarbin "The Rhetoric of Terror: "War" as Misplaced Metaphor" *Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice*, eds John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer (New York, NY: Routledge 2007), 30.

guarantee that something will not happen focuses on the source of population's reactance. This can be a powerful tool for the JFC but to not carry through with the guarantee can be detrimental indeed and will thus widen the "say-do" gap. There are also other techniques that can be used as part of an influence strategy that have also been empirically tested and proven to be successful. This includes rapidly responding to information and misinformation which can be traced to fundamental attribution error.<sup>69</sup>

In the JFCs development and implementation of an influence strategy, overcoming resistance can provide important insights. The JFC can open up a dialogue of ideas by engaging audiences, principally the military and governmental leaders, and establishing a discourse. This flow of information can help in part in the refinement of an overall theater strategy that if partner nations are involved, it can develop a more tenable strategy for all. The JFC can use Dr. Knowles' "Omega Strategy" to reduce resistance to ideas and develop a shared meaning which will enhance influence strategy implementation. To help in establishing a dialogue of ideas and the development of shared meaning, political campaign and marketing models also offer valuable insights into the concept of influence.

## **Case Studies of Influence Operations**

### **Political Campaign Models**

John J. Pitney writes "politics resembles warfare, so military literature can teach us something about political action."<sup>70</sup> This monograph makes a similar but opposite assertion. Political campaigns can teach us something about designing military strategy to influence populations. The proven techniques to gain public support for specific candidates, parties and platforms provide excellent lessons for JFCs attempting to garner public, albeit foreign, support for ideas. Certainly both local and national political

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<sup>69</sup> Empirical studies of crises management and rumors in organizations led to these findings. For studies in crises management see Jennefer Borda., Susan Mackay-Kallis., "A Model for Crises Management," in *Responding to Crises: A Rhetorical Approach to Crises Communication* ed. Dan Pyle Millar and Robert L. Heath (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2003) 117-139. Fundamental attribution error is the tendency for people to over-emphasize dispositional, personality or cultural based behaviors. Less Ross, "The Intuitive Psychologist and his Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attributions Process" in *Advances in experimental Social Psychology*, ed L. Berkowitz (Academic Press, New York, NY: 1977).

<sup>70</sup> John J. Pitney. *The Art of Political Warfare*. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 3.

campaigns offer many instructive cases for the JFC. A review of how political campaigns are conducted provides valuable insights to a military influence strategy.

In a study by the RAND Corporation on effective influence operations, there are essentially two types of political campaigns. The first is a party-centered campaign where the messages are in conjunction with the party platform. The second is a candidate-centered campaign, where the candidate decides which messages to support from the party platform and which messages should be developed and related individually to the candidate. Both of these types of campaigns depend upon influence techniques to get their messages across.<sup>71</sup> A political campaign can be divided up into phases including the planning and execution and include: Assessment of the electorate, identification of target groups, measurement of baseline attitudes, development, testing and the fielding of messages, and making additional measurements leading to the adaptation of messages to changing circumstances or developments.<sup>72</sup> From a military planning perspective, these phases can be integrated into the normal phasing of an operation.<sup>73</sup>

In the first phase, the assessment of the electorate, political campaign managers will focus on various components of their environment. The first is an assessment of the political terrain. This assessment begins by looking at the political landscape through asking a number of questions including: What other competitors may be in the environment? What are the demographics of the contested area? What political office or position is the election for? This assessment methodology is comparable to military operations where a commander may look at a number of variables while conducting mission

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<sup>71</sup> For both types of campaigns the main objective is to get the message across to voters. The campaigns define what the message is and what the strategy is to reach the voters who are most probable to be swayed by the message. How this is done can depend on the type of campaign being conducted. See Eric V. Larson, Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H Schwartz, Quantic Cathryn Thurston, *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities*, 111-112.

<sup>72</sup> The RAND study believes this framework is easily adaptable to various situations. See Eric V. Larson, Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H Schwartz, Quantic Cathryn Thurston, *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities*, 114.

<sup>73</sup> To assist the JFC in planning and controlling an operation, phasing can be used to separate parts of operations that are different. Changes in phasing usually involve changing of tasks. See *Field Manual 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 1-17.

analysis such as geography, enemy disposition, civilian demographics and mission. One essential component of this political terrain analysis is the demographics of the potential voters.<sup>74</sup>

Successful political campaigns are dependent upon understanding the demographics of their respective areas. Knowledge of race, ethnicity, education levels, shopping habits, religious preferences, gender, age distribution, income and a number of other variables are essential to mapping the political campaign for perspective candidates in the formulation of strategy. Astute political campaign managers can make inferences based upon combinations of the demographic makeup of their electoral districts. These demographic inferences are based in probability theory and help the campaign designer establish a strategy that can be tested and measured using a variety of statistical methods.<sup>75</sup> A major source of statistical data for political campaigns in the United States is the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*.<sup>76</sup>

The underpinning of a political campaign strategy is the statistical analysis of the electoral district. The political campaign manager develops the guidelines of the strategy through the electoral history of voting trends. Additionally, the political campaign manager helps identify demographic trends that may more easily change voting behavior in favor of one candidate or another. The political campaign manager can validate if voting behaviors are often reflected along party lines. The political campaign manager can match the voting history with the demographics and provide the campaign with targeted audiences. The audiences that political campaign managers try to identify and target are the swing voters. These swing voters are much akin to the fence-sitters a military command will try to identify in an

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<sup>74</sup>Eric V. Larson, Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H Schwartz, Quantic Cathryn Thurston, *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities*, 114-115.

<sup>75</sup> Probability Theory is the branch of mathematics concerned with the analysis of random phenomena. Quantitative statistical methods in politics vary from census statistics in that they may not accurately represent public opinion. The use statistical methods in politics is not a new approach. See Stuart A Rice., "Quantitative Methods in Politics" *Journal of American Statistical Association* Vol 33, No 201 (American Statistical Association, Mar 1938) <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2279119.pdf> (accessed online on 23 January 2010).

<sup>76</sup> The *Statistical Abstract of the United States* is the authoritative and comprehensive summary of statistics on the social, political, and economic organization of the United States. See <http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/> (accessed online on 23 January 2010).

insurgency. These statistical inferences help in the development of a political campaign strategy and the shaping of issue preferences by the candidate.<sup>77</sup> Thus, thoroughly knowing the demographics of potential voters, especially focusing on the swing voters, provides a fundamentally necessary component of the strategy that professional political campaigners will pursue.

In addition, a political campaign manager will also conduct opposition research in combination with the demographic analysis. Often associated with mud-slinging and negative campaign advertisements, opposition research goes beyond just attacking an opposition candidate. Opposition research can be defined as research that “is public-records research on the political, business, professional and personal background of candidates.”<sup>78</sup> It looks both retrospectively at what the candidate has said and done in the past as well as provide some introspective inference on what the candidate may do in the future based on their previous record. Often, opposition research will seek small pieces of factual information which can be used, sometime out of context, to convey a negative message.<sup>79</sup> The strength of opposition research is the use of factual information that is perceived as truthful even if placed in a slightly different perspective. It is not about undercutting an opponent but providing a comparison of positions for the benefit of the voters. All of the assessment of the political environment can be associated with the way a joint force staff would conduct environmental framing or mission analysis.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Eric V. Larson, Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H Schwartz, Quantic Cathryn Thurston, *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities*, 117-118. The electoral targeting becomes the perennial quest for the deciding vote focused on the swing or median voter, which normally resides in a small proportion compared to the whole voting population.

<sup>78</sup> This process consists of records and information gathering and verifying publically accessed documents. The focus is on retrospective aspects of the political career of the opponent as voters can more easily identify with what happened in the past than an introspective examples of an opponent. See Alan Reger, “Setting the record Straight,” in *Winning Elections: Political Campaign Management, Strategy and Tactics*, ed Ronald A. Foucheux, (New York, NY: M. Evans and Co., Inc 2003), 215.

<sup>79</sup> Given certain interpretation of messages, often factual information can convey an entirely different meaning in which the facts were originally based. Rich Galen places it in context by stating it “is the process of finding out as much about your opponent as your opponent probably knows about you.” See Rich Galen, “Opposition Research: The Power of Information,” in *Winning Elections: Political Campaign Management, Strategy and Tactics*, ed Ronald A. Foucheux, (New York, NY: M. Evans and Co., Inc 2003), 199.

<sup>80</sup> For a detailed description of mission analysis and environmental framing see United States department of the Army, Field Manual 5-0, *The Operations Process (Final Approved Draft)*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010) B-6 and 3-8 – 3-10.



Political campaigns also spend tremendous time and resources on advertising strategies.

Empirical research studies point toward the importance of both negative and positive political campaign advertising. Yet, quantifying the impact of advertising on a political campaign remains problematic and it may be the candidate that is more important than the advertisement.<sup>81</sup> This may also be indicative of the lack of utility of strategic communication advertising techniques exercised by military commanders. Yet, there are also positive goals that can be achieved through political campaign advertising and include the development of the name recognition of a candidate. This reinforces the candidate to those who have selected him or her and redefines the perceptions of a candidate or party.<sup>82</sup> Even with the problematic quantification of the utility of political advertising, it is still used to great extent.

Political advertising can be generally separated into four general categories. First, not only are there positive advertisements that improve a candidate's name recognition. They also paint them in a positive light including perspectives on issues (in relation to the demographic of the receiving audience) as well as emphasizing their personal leadership qualities. Second, there are negative advertisements that question an opponent's credentials, leadership qualities and perspectives on issues (again in relation to the receiving audience). Third, there is a set of reactive response advertisements designed to respond to an opponent's negative advertisements and finally, there are proactive inoculation advertisements that can preemptively reduce the significance of anticipated negative attacks from an opponent.<sup>83</sup> Additionally, advertising trends indicate an upsurge in the use of social media. In fact, Edelman Corporation, a leading

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<sup>81</sup> Based on an empirical research that measured the candidate and negative third party ads. See Joseph W. Boesch and Shinya Wakao, "When the messenger matters more than the message: The influence of candidate and third party ads in the 2008 presidential election" NYU Experimental Political Science Conference 6-7 February 2008 <http://cess.nyu.edu/ExpPoliSci-Con-2-09/Papers/conference%20paper-nyu-Final-Jboesch.pdf> (accessed January23, 2010).

<sup>82</sup> L.P. Devlin examined the purposes that political campaign advertising can be used. See L. P. Devlin, "An Analysis of Presidential Television Commercials, 1952-1984," in Lynda Lee Kaid, Dan D. Nimmo, and Keith R. Sanders, eds., *New Perspectives on Political Advertising* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 21-54.

<sup>83</sup> Based upon analysis by Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, a Professor of Advertising and Public Relations at the University of Alabama and Gary A. Copeland, a Professor of Telecommunication, Film and Speech Communication at the University of Alabama. See Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, and Gary A. Copeland, *Inside Political Campaigns: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Preager, 1997), 162.

international public relations firm, attributes the 2008 Obama campaign's proclivity to online advocacy as a major reason for his victory.<sup>84</sup>

In the execution of political campaigns, there are specific analytical tools that a candidate's political campaign team employs. These tools have formed an integral part of recent political campaigns. Recently, new communications technologies including the internet, direct and targeted mailing, mass mobile phone texting as well as phone banks have become a fundamental part of campaign execution. To properly employ these communications techniques, political campaign managers have searched for more accurate methods of predicting perspective voter behavior. The first of these methods is known as the employment of focus groups.

A focus group is "a carefully planned discussion designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, nonthreatening environment."<sup>85</sup> The focus group has been normally used for general academic research but has since moved into the realm of political campaigning. The focus group is selected based on the information the researcher or political campaign manager requires. The demographics of the group are carefully chosen to obtain optimal results for accurate research. A moderator leads a discussion to obtain preferences of the group. These preferences can inform future political strategies. Often focus groups can validate or test information that is currently being executed by the political campaign.<sup>86</sup> In conjunction with focus groups, a modern political campaign manager can also use surveys and polling.

Polling has become an expensive but vital aspect of modern political campaigns. Political campaigns will conduct polling for a variety of reasons including attempts to understand what is really

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<sup>84</sup> The Obama campaign had a 10-1 advantage over the McCain campaign in online staff. This includes a 2-1 advantage in web site traffic, 4-1 advantage in YouTube views, and a 5-1 advantage in Facebook friends. See "The Social Media Pulpit: Barack Obama's Social Media Toolkit" Edelman 2009 <http://www.edelman.com/image/insights/content/Social%20Pulpit%20-%20Barack%20Obamas%20Social%20Media%20Toolkit%201.09.pdf> (accessed January 23, 2010).

<sup>85</sup> R. A. Krueger, and Mary Ann Casey, *Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc., 2000), 18.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, 18. Richard Krueger and Mary Ann Casey provide a step-by-step guide in the design, preparation, execution and assessment of focus groups for the purpose of research.

important to voters. It is used to test and fine-tune political advertisements and messages. Polling can also be used to assess name recognition of a candidate, voter preferences as well as their concerns so that political campaign managers can focus on the correct issues. Optimally, “polls allow campaign managers to gauge the potential effectiveness of strategies and tactics.”<sup>87</sup> Military practitioners can also use polling to determine effectiveness of influence campaigns.

To gauge potential effectiveness, campaign managers use several statistical methods including the analysis of the means and standard deviations of their data sets. This statistical method is used to understand and interpret responses to polling.<sup>88</sup> Additionally, regression analysis assists political campaign managers to conduct predicative analysis on voter behavior that will in turn shape the campaign strategy in the future.<sup>89</sup> Once a hypothesis is established on voter behavior, an astute political campaign manager can develop targeted techniques to modify behavior. Specifically they can get a targeted group to vote for a certain candidate through targeted messaging and the actual design of message(s).

Targeted messaging includes a variety of methods including canvassing, phone calling, phone texting, direct mailing, forums, town halls and meetings. To engage directly with a perspective voter in a local campaign, grass roots methods relay on door-to-door canvassing. Targeted phone calling is another outreach event where lists can be generated of swing voters. These target lists are used for other techniques after the initial contacts. Phone banking and direct mail are techniques especially relevant for the mobilization of likely voters on the day of the election. These quick release methods can be expensive and are only used to mobilize the masses. Targeted town hall meetings and forums may be beneficial for swing voters who may not have previous exposure to a candidate. Piggy-backing with

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<sup>87</sup> For additional detail and a full list of the uses of polling in political campaigns see Daniel M. Shea and Michael J. Burton, *Campaign Craft: The Strategies, Tactics, and the Art of Political Campaign Management* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001).

<sup>88</sup> Eric V. Larson, Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H Schwartz, Quantic Cathryn Thurston, *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities*, 127. Techniques for statistical analysis of political polling include analysis of variance (ANOVA) and chi-squared automatic interaction detector (CHAID).

<sup>89</sup> Ibid, 127. Simple and multiple correlation analysis provides an analysis of the associations and linkages between identified variables.

existing local meetings so swing voters are not forced to decide to attend the meeting for an unknown candidate is beneficial early in the campaign.<sup>90</sup> In all of these techniques, the message itself is a critical component.

A political campaign message is a brief statement sent to a targeted audience that identifies a positive aspect of the candidate's campaign. Developing the right message often becomes the "paramount task of the campaign."<sup>91</sup> The message is tailored for specific circumstances and changed as the campaign evolves. The message is normally short possibly up to thirty words, and is more focused than the general campaign theme. A good message has certain aspects including a clear, concise, consistent, convincing, statement. The political campaign message should contrast opposing messages.<sup>92</sup>

Political campaign models offer four valuable techniques for the JFC influence strategy. The first is the use of statistical analysis in assessing population demographics. Often the JFC does not have the kind of data an American political campaign manager may have access to. This is due to the lack of census data in the underdeveloped countries of their area of responsibility. The JFC will have to construct methods to overcome these shortfalls including establishing a working database for future use. The second is the use of focus groups to understand the host nation populace. The third is the use of polling complimented with statistical analysis to help assessment and the final technique is the use of targeted messaging campaigns using the variety of techniques described above. Business marketing may also provide some valuable techniques for a JFCs influence strategy.

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<sup>90</sup> These grassroots methods are specifically for divisional and constituency level political campaigns. See the resources and tools section of the Independent Progressive Politics Networks (IPPN) <http://www.ippn.org/ManualsandPamphlets> (accessed January 23, 2010).

<sup>91</sup> Eric V. Larson, Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H Schwartz, Quantic Cathryn Thurston, *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities*, 128. The correct message will appeal to voters needs, connect the issues to voters concerns and is relevant and timely.

<sup>92</sup> From the Democracy For America Training Manual on message development. [http://www.democracyforamerica.com/uploads/0005/4001/DFA\\_Training\\_Manual\\_2008\\_-\\_Chapter\\_6\\_Messaging.pdf](http://www.democracyforamerica.com/uploads/0005/4001/DFA_Training_Manual_2008_-_Chapter_6_Messaging.pdf) (accessed January 23, 2010).

## Business Marketing Models

Todd Helmus, Christopher Paul and Russell Glenn believe “business marketing practices provide a useful framework for improving U.S. military efforts to shape indigenous audience attitudes and behaviors.”<sup>93</sup> Business and marketing corporations depend on their ability to effectively influence populations in order to sell their products or services. Just as with the political campaigner who is selling a name or position, the business marketing professional also must rely on effective influence techniques to sell their products. The concepts of market research, the branding and positioning of products and services offer valuable insights to the JFC to incorporate into the development and implementation of an influence strategy.

The American Marketing Association defines marketing as “an organizational function and a set of processes for creating, communicating, and delivering value to customers and for managing customer relationships in ways that benefit the organization and its stakeholders.”<sup>94</sup> This definition could easily be transferred for use by the JFCs. In a systematic approach of marketing there are three general steps identified. These consist of brand development, advertising development and the launch and tracking of a product or service.<sup>95</sup> Building a brand is the first general step of marketing.

A brand can be defined as “a name, term, design, symbol, or any other feature that identifies one seller's goods or service as distinct from those of other sellers.”<sup>96</sup> The legal term for brand is trademark. A brand may identify one item, a family of items, or all items of that seller. If used for the firm as a whole, the preferred term is trade name. To develop a brand, a business will base it on the needs of the market for which they will be operating in. The following description will highlight the process of new

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<sup>93</sup> Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul and Russell W. Glenn., *Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operations* (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2007), xvi.

<sup>94</sup> Definition from the American Marketing Association online at: [http://www.marketingpower.com/\\_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=M](http://www.marketingpower.com/_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=M) (accessed January 24, 2010).

<sup>95</sup> Eric V. Larson, Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H Schwartz, Quantic Cathryn Thurston, *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities*, 92. These three steps are from a Rand study on influence operations. .

<sup>96</sup> Definition from the American Marketing Association online at: [http://www.marketingpower.com/\\_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=B](http://www.marketingpower.com/_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=B) (accessed January 24, 2010).

product development which can be defined as “the overall process of strategy, organization, concept generation, concept and marketing plan evaluation, and commercialization of a new product.”<sup>97</sup> Like political campaigns and military operations, research and analysis is required prior to developing a plan.

To identify a need in the market, a certain degree of initial research is required. One method of brand research is known as ethnography and is a detailed and descriptive study of a group, their behavior, characteristics and their culture. Marketing professionals will use ethnographic research to determine how individuals and groups think about and use products in their lives. Ethnographic research is usually used early in the product development and branding cycle. Like in political campaigns, focus groups are central to ethnographic marketing research. It can help the marketing professional identify what products consumers may desire but are unable to obtain. Another technique for identifying what a consumer wants is known as market gap analysis and identifying market deficiencies. Market gap analysis usually entails a quantitative assessment of the current market to identify what is and is not meeting customer needs. This usually comes in the form of both demand and supply side gaps.<sup>98</sup> Once an assessment is conducted and unmet needs are identified either through focus groups or a gap analysis, the marketing professional can identify potential products for development.

A key evaluation step in the product developmental process includes a “product use test.” This involves the development of a prototype and a pilot test where the product is given to intended target audiences and they are asked to provide feedback. The purpose of this test is threefold. First, to see if the item developed has the attributes prescribed. Second, to learn the product developed satisfies the need

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<sup>97</sup> The definition of new product development can occasionally be restricted to the technical aspect of product development including research and development. See the definition from the American Marketing Association online at: <http://www.marketingpower.com/layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=N#new+product+development> (accessed January 24, 2010).

<sup>98</sup> Demand side gaps include a situation where consumers are not satisfied with the products that are available either because of inadequate service or that they are too expensive. Supply side gaps include firms that provide a service but that it can be met by another firm at a lower cost.

identified. Finally, the product use test determines how and by whom the product is used.<sup>99</sup> The next general step in new product development is the refinement of the targeted consumer group.

To focus the marketing strategy, there are two general methods a marketing professional can use. The first method to identify the most likely consumers to use the product is to conduct surveys. Scientifically based research surveys using sampling techniques help the marketing strategist develop the brand. This brand is based on the consumer's demographics, consumption habits, media habits and other aspects of their personal and cultural traits. Much like the survey techniques of the political campaign, marketing focused surveys provide practical data to the marketing professional about the targeted consumer group.<sup>100</sup> Focus groups also assist the marketing professional in consumer target group refinement.

The marketing professional will next develop the concept of the brand. Branding refers to the name, term, design, symbol or any other features that may be applicable to the product. The marketing professional will then begin a thorough testing process to identify the greatest profit margin for the product. The intent is to identify a product or service that has distinct differences from the similar services on the market. The brand name associated with the product or service should be associated by the consumer. This association can be made by symbols or names and may not be directly tied to the specific product but is tied to the perception individuals have about the product itself. This perception is formed through all of the interactions people have with the brand typically from advertising and other association with the products or line of products.<sup>101</sup> Again, focus groups can also be used at this stage as they can help in the refinement of the product with an emphasis on product positioning.

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<sup>99</sup> See the American Marketing Association online at: [http://www.marketingpower.com/\\_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=P](http://www.marketingpower.com/_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=P) (accessed January 24, 2010).

<sup>100</sup> Additional detail on marketing survey question data can be found in Eric V. Larson, Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H Schwartz, Quantic Cathryn Thurston, *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities*, 95.

<sup>101</sup> Tim Calkins, "The Challenge of Branding" in Alice M. Tybout and Tim Calkins, eds., *Kellogg on Branding* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2005), 1-8.

Product positioning is “the way consumers, users, buyers, and others view competitive brands or types of products.”<sup>102</sup> It is a process not necessarily based on the attributes of the product but on consumers cognitive perceptions. New product positioning involves determining how to introduce a new product as it is compared to its similar products on the market. The positioning of both new and updated products is combined with a target segment analysis to assist in marketing decisions. Additional testing of the product continues to take place, this “includes volumetric forecasting, which combines survey data, marketing plan data, and modeling to produce estimates for unit and dollar sales in the first year of the product launch.”<sup>103</sup> At this point the marketing professional will begin to look at developing an advertising strategy for the tested product brand.

The advertising development for a new brand has two broad steps. The first is the development of a variety of advertising campaigns based on the targeted consumers for the product. A single advertising campaign can be defined as “a group of advertisements, commercials, and related promotional materials and activities that are designed to be used during the same period of time as part of a coordinated advertising plan to meet the specified advertising objectives of a client.”<sup>104</sup> The second step is the testing of the advertising campaign to determine the best methods to increase product sales. The marketing professional will develop multiple campaigns and conduct advertising effectiveness tests that conduct “an evaluation of the extent to which a specific advertisement or advertising campaign meets the objectives specified by the client. There is a wide variety of approaches to evaluation, including inquiry

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<sup>102</sup> As determined by market research techniques including conjoint analysis which is statistical technique in which respondents' utilities or valuations of attributes are inferred from the preferences they express for various combinations of these attributes and other methods of statistical analysis.

<sup>103</sup> Eric V. Larson, Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H Schwartz, Quantic Cathryn Thurston, *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities*, 97. N For volumetric forecasting different samples of respondents are shown the different concepts under consideration and are asked a series of questions. This data is used with demographic information and combined with advertising and distribution plans to generate estimates of sales.

<sup>104</sup> See the American Marketing Association online at: [http://www.marketingpower.com/\\_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=A](http://www.marketingpower.com/_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=A) (accessed January 24, 2010).



tests, recall tests, and market tests.”<sup>105</sup> The JFC can also utilize the exact same techniques. The advertising professional will thoroughly test message prior to launch which will save undue tribulations in communication with culturally different audiences.

Once the brand is sufficiently researched and the advertising campaign is tested, the brand is launched. The marketing plan is executed by the business launching the product. The products performance in the market place is evaluated over time. Methods for performance evaluation include test marketing where the product is only marketed in a select location such as cities or towns and then expanded as applicable. Other methods include measuring the adoption process which refers “to a model of stages in the purchase process ranging from awareness to knowledge, evaluation, trial, and adoption.”<sup>106</sup> The adoption process can also be measured by focus groups and surveys.

In addition to the traditional marketing techniques of products and services for profit, there are other applicable methods of business marketing to military affairs. Specifically, these are concepts linked with “ideas” instead of products. These marketing techniques include cause marketing and sponsorship. Cause marketing can be defined as a “promotional strategy that links a company’s sales campaign directly to a nonprofit organization. Generally includes an offer by the sponsor to make a donation to the cause with purchase of its product or service.”<sup>107</sup> It is linked not only to the product but also into a consumer buying into an idea such as curing cancer or saying no to drugs. This has tremendous military applicability, especially in insurgencies when the JFCs and their adversaries may be competing over ideas.

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<sup>105</sup> See the American Marketing Association online at:  
[http://www.marketingpower.com/\\_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=A](http://www.marketingpower.com/_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=A) (accessed January 24, 2010).

<sup>106</sup> The adoption process is based on AIDA model which is an approach to understanding how advertising and selling supposedly work. The assumption is that the consumer passes through several steps in the influence process. First, Attention must be developed, to be followed by Interest, Desire, and finally Action as called for in the message. See Jerome E. McCarty and William D. Perreault, Jr., *Basic Marketing* (Boston, MA: Richard D. Irwin Inc, 1993), 425-246.

<sup>107</sup> See the American Marketing Association online at:  
[http://www.marketingpower.com/\\_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=C](http://www.marketingpower.com/_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=C) (accessed January 24, 2010).

Sponsorship is another marketing technique that is slightly different from traditional product and service marketing. In sponsorship, a business can pay a fee (cash or other) “to a property (typically sports, entertainment, non-profit event or organization) in return for access to the exploitable commercial potential associated with that property.”<sup>108</sup> With all of the techniques of business marketing, there are some common mistakes made.

Common business marketing mistakes include lack of research and testing, where there can be errors in sampling including population distribution errors. Another common mistake is the misinterpretation or altogether ignoring of the results of research. This includes data analysis errors from simple mathematical mistakes to more complex statistical inference errors. Additional common mistakes include saturating the market with multiple and different messages. Much like a political campaign message, the idea is to implement a simple message that focuses on building brand equity.<sup>109</sup>

Business marketing offers three methods that have potential value for a JFC influence strategy. The first is brand development that requires initial research of a demographic population, a product use test, the refinement and positioning of the product. The second is the advertising campaign development including the testing of advertisements. Finally, the launch and tracking of a product to evaluate performance through test and measurement of adaption using similar techniques of focus groups and polling have potential for the development of a JFC influence strategy. Taking the above, the JFC influence strategy must integrate all of the ideas to achieve a dynamic influential effect.

## **Conclusion**

Massive reorganization efforts and substantial increases in budgetary resources are not required to make positive changes to JFC efforts in influence operations. But progressive measures of engagement and adjustments on how to effectively influence are in fact required to encourage change. Additionally, a

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<sup>108</sup> See the American Marketing Association online at: [http://www.marketingpower.com/\\_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=S#Sponsorship](http://www.marketingpower.com/_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=S#Sponsorship) (accessed January 24, 2010).

<sup>109</sup> Eric V. Larson, Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H Schwartz, Quantic Cathryn Thurston, *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities*, 107-108. Common mistakes based on analysis.

more accurate use of the conceptual terms is also warranted including the use of the term influence as an alternative to strategic communication. This will enable JFCs to describe what is actually trying to be accomplished. By using the proven methods of political campaigns and business marketing, the JFC can efficiently confront the problems of contemporary conflicts and establish effective strategies for the future.

In a review of Colonel Lamborn's criticism of contemporary information operations in Afghanistan, the recommendations provided below will not only satisfy the fatal failures he identified but also establish a framework for future operations. First, by establishing a coherent assessment process based on statistical analysis that utilizes polling and focus groups, the JFC will help in producing products that identify the needs of the population using a culturally sensitive format. These products will reduce the resistance of the population. Second, using the same methods a marketing professional would use in producing and distributing a product, the polling and focus groups can again validate the credibility of messages and ideas in the eyes the populace. This satisfies the credibility problem for the JFCs. Third, accounting for the needs of the local population as opposed to the desires of the United States can also be realized by using polling and focus groups. The use of Dr. Knowles' "Omega Strategy" will compliment these efforts in resistance reduction leading to better influence. The final flaw Colonel Lamborn identifies is the failure in integration of every message, and this becomes the crux of the argument of this monograph. To integrate every message, including every action the JFC undertakes, it becomes paramount that the JFCs influence strategy is the overall JFCs theater strategy and not as a supporting effort. Certainly an influence strategy should not be separate and distinct but as a central theme of the theater strategy and should focus on overcoming the resistance especially that of the fence-sitting population.

## **Recommendations**

The Defense Science Board makes the recommendation to "significantly increase the strategic communications budgets of each Combatant Commander" to accomplish four primary tasks to improve

strategic communication. These are resources to increase cultural research and analysis within the combatant commanders area of responsibility, provide communications infrastructure to support stability and disaster relief, increase public affairs in support of security cooperation, and increase collaborative planning and experimentation with nongovernment organizations.<sup>110</sup> There is no guarantee that the recommendations of the Defense Science Board will be turned into reality, specifically the recommendations for increased budgets. Competing national security requirements may or may not become more important. Because of this, a realistic evaluation of the recommendations is required. The following recommendations will cover changes to how the JFC conducts assessments of the environment, synchronizes current capabilities, change operating concepts and incorporates the principles to overcome resistance to an idea by integrating the techniques from political and business marketing campaigns. The recommendations will be organized into three broad categories, assessments, planning and execution.

## **Assessments**

It is unrealistic to suggest JFCs create new robust organizations to conduct assessments of the information environment in support of influence efforts. It is also unrealistic to suggest that a robust assessment cell can understand all of the nuances of the information environment. It is practical to suggest that current JFC assessment capabilities and structures can modify the way they measure effectiveness of current influence efforts. They can incorporate methods for determining progress of influence operations through the synthesis of audience behavior. In fact, a number of JFCs already have established assessment activities for their communication efforts.<sup>111</sup> By using these preexisting organizations and incorporating lessons from political and business marketing campaigns, the activities in

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<sup>110</sup> Specifically, the Defense Science Board recommends the establishment and enhancement of Combatant Commander budgets for strategic communication including the funding of Federally Funding Research and Development Centers (e.g. IDA, RAND) for cultural analysis and program development in the GCC area of responsibility as well as providing a communications infrastructure in support of stability operations and disaster relief operations. See the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication January 2008 PPT Presentation online at: [http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache:0x7YPvM9MKkJ:www.publicdiplomacycouncil.org/uploads/DSB\\_TF\\_on\\_Strategic\\_Communication.pdf+defense+science+board+strategic+communication+2008&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us](http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache:0x7YPvM9MKkJ:www.publicdiplomacycouncil.org/uploads/DSB_TF_on_Strategic_Communication.pdf+defense+science+board+strategic+communication+2008&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us) (accessed February, 15 2010).

<sup>111</sup> *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy*, US Joint Forces Command. IV-22 – IV 30. Specifically USCENTCOM and MNF-I in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

the contemporary operating environment will improve.<sup>112</sup> This begins with gaining an appreciation for the environment through the proven methods of statistical analysis.

The statistical analysis of the demographics of a JFC's area of responsibility may prove to be an essential component in the construction of any influence strategy. Yet, most JFC areas of responsibility lack the statistical information databases the United States political campaigns rely upon, specifically the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*. The JFC must make a concerted effort to establish an accurate database containing information that will be helpful for future activities. In the mean time, through the use of statistical inference and induction, the JFC can draw conclusions about the demographics of their respective areas of responsibility. The JFC should dedicate a small amount of resources to gathering the minimum data sets to draw conclusions based on probability. Conclusions drawn from statistical analysis, even those conclusions with a low probability, can be tested through the use of polling and focus groups. In fact, a significant portion of JFC efforts should be directed towards the use of polling and focus groups. Initially, this can partially make up for the lack of solid statistical data.

First, polling methods and techniques are used extensively for both political and business marketing campaigns. They offer an accurate way to assess certain aspects of a given population for the JFC. Sensible increases in polling activities can occur in two ways. The first is a moderate increase in funding for the contracting of professional polling organizations to help gather appropriate data and draw logical conclusions. This can help in both the processing of data collection and in confirming accuracy of the data itself. The second is expanding the knowledge of the JFC and staff in appropriate uses for polling data, statistical inference and induction. Having access to polling data is one step, drawing accurate conclusions from the data for future actions is another. These recommendations have both short and long term implications.

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<sup>112</sup> For an assessment framework for contemporary operations that GCCs can use for general assessment see Michael Dziedzic., Barbara Sotirin., John Agoglia, "Measuring Progress in Conflict environments (MPICE): A metrics framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization" *United States Institute for Peace* online at <http://www.usip.org/resources/measuring-progress-conflict-environments-mpice> (accessed February 15, 2010).

In the short term, contracting capabilities that help in public relations and political campaigning will be useful but does come with an overhead cost. This overhead cost will prove to be of value as this assertion is based on the importance of polling statistical analysis for both successful political campaign and marketing ventures. The contracted capability should serve two functions; the first is to help in gathering the data itself. The second is the capability to understand what the data means through statistical analysis by integrating it into the JFCs overall planning and execution process. This integration can be accomplished through the use of the JFC communication strategy director, small coordinating staff and appropriate working groups. In fact, all JFCs have evolved to utilizing the staff organization model of single communication director with a small coordinating staff. Recommending any changes to this model would be contrary to the evaluative criteria and problematic. It is recommended that the communications director and coordinating staff become well versed in the use of polling and statistical analysis to shape the planning and execution of the JFC.<sup>113</sup> Yet, drawing conclusions from statistical inference should not be considered establishing accurate causality. Indeed, any inference drawn from polling data should be considered stochastic and based in probability and not as a deterministic solution. Commanders should establish prudent risk taking based on any inferences generated from this analysis.

In the long term, commanders and staff must become better versed in the application of polling and statistical analysis. Joint institutional education advancements are a more holistic solution and beyond the scope of this monograph. Yet, the JFC can institute internal educational and training measures over time. These internal educational and training measures can occur as guest lectures, officer professional development and short term courses for the commander and staff. These approaches will move the JFC towards a better understanding of the capabilities of statistical inference. Individuals can also be encouraged to gain a better understanding of the use of data in planning through self and organizational study of the use of quantitative and qualitative empirical research methods. This study can

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<sup>113</sup> *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy*, US Joint Forces. III-1 – III-17. Provides a description and analysis of current joint practices and initiatives in staff organization.

occur through most civilian graduate programs which will enable an elementary understanding of the basic principles of statistics and probability.<sup>114</sup>

Focus groups provide the second technique used extensively by both political and business marketing campaigns. A focus group can serve multiple functions for the JFC across assessment, planning and even execution activities. First, a focus group can gain a general understanding of the perceptions of a targeted demographic. Although the sample size of an average focus group (generally 8-12 people) is too small to draw an accurate statistical inference, a focus group can help shape and target further assessment efforts. A focus group can also help validate established statistical inferences generated from polling data. The establishment of techniques and procedures for the use of focus groups can occur in multiple ways and also along short term and long term planning horizons. Short term solutions to the establishment of focus groups parallel the establishment of the use of polling. Contracting professional political and marketing organizations to establish techniques for the utilization of focus groups will provide short term benefits for the JFC at a moderate cost. Second, just as in marketing campaigns, focus groups can also help test messages in a closed system.<sup>115</sup> This helps the command test messages prior to being released into the vast and open information environment. Adjustments can be made to the messages being prepared to better contribute to the influential capabilities. Finally, perceptions of the JFCs activities can also be gauged and modified based on the responses gathered from focus groups. Once assessments are refined through the use of polling and focus groups, influence planning must be synchronized across existing JFC functions.

## **Planning**

Influence planning must not only encompass the preexisting capabilities of the JFC to support strategic communication but also account for all of the actions taken by the JFC based on the nature of

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<sup>114</sup> The argument for institutional reform of officer professional education is beyond the scope of this monograph.

<sup>115</sup> A closed system is an isolated system that has no interaction with its external environment. Messages can be tested in the focus group and methods of control can be established so external influence upon the message can be controlled. For a detailed description on conduct research using focus groups see Richard A. Kruger and Mary Anne Casey, *Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2009).

communications.<sup>116</sup> To do this, influence planning must not occur in the centralized communication section of the JFC as a separate strategy. Influence planning must be an essential component of the theater strategy as it is developed. This planning should be based on the JFC strategic estimate which is partially informed by the political and marketing methods of assessment. It is the JFC theater strategic development that consolidates and synchronizes influence operations. The influence strategy can thus link all of the JFC actions to the effects of communications in the joint operations planning process.<sup>117</sup> Additionally, the development of influence planning should incorporate the lessons from the Arizona State Consortium for Strategic Communications “Pragmatic Complexity Model.”

First, joint force planners must develop variations of themes and messages. Each theme or message must be tested utilizing the techniques of brand and advertizing development. Focus groups again become a central part of the development of various themes and messages. The JFCs, with the various cultural characteristics in their respective areas of responsibility should utilize multiple focus groups tailored in the same manner as ethnographic research and gap analysis. Second, utilizing the joint operations planning process, multiple contingencies should be planned for, not only to take advantage of changes in the system where influence can be generated, but also as a measure of accounting for failure that is sure to come. Finally, the joint force planners should construct command and control functions that accommodate variation and decentralize authority for the execution of communications activities. In addition to the recommendations of the Arizona State Consortium for Strategic Communications “Pragmatic complexity Model,” the joint force planners must also incorporate methods of rhetoric and persuasion including the “Omega strategies” to reduce resistance. Indeed, overcoming resistance is paramount to success.

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<sup>116</sup> *Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy*, US Joint Forces Command Annex B. The traditional and preexisting capabilities of a JFC in support of Strategic Communications include the information operations, civil-military operations, public affairs, defense support to public diplomacy, and visual information support. *Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy*, US Joint Forces Command (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 27 October 2009) Annex B.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.* Annex E, F and G. For format and guidance for an annex to an operation plan including public affairs engagement and communications planning considerations.



Planning for the reduction of resistance can be a particularly influential tool when used in conjunction with military diplomacy.<sup>118</sup> Forms for resistance reduction include coalition and multinational theater strategy development conferences. This is where United States military leaders can leverage existing military to military relationships to further the development of strategy that is mutually beneficial for all parties involved. The use of the “Omega strategy” will prove to be of value in this context. The plan developed mutually through multiple partners may not be exactly what the JFC desires but the end result of mutual development may be more legitimate than could have been achieved through unilateral planning. This planning venture may not be immediately prevalent but in future endeavors may prove to be of benefit because of the reduced resistance of multinational partners. Another benefit of reducing resistance is felt in the close coordination with allies and partners. This interaction and influence can be turned into working by, with and through foreign governments and their militaries instead of conducting a unilateral approach. In addition to planning functions, political and business marketing also offer applicable techniques for the execution of influence activities.

## **Execution**

Just as a product is launched and tracked, the JFC can evaluate the performance of a message and/or action through multiple techniques. Focus groups are also applicable during this process where the JFC can assess the success of influence activities, not in deterministic terms, but as one of many factors that add to perception. The JFC can go on to adapt messages or increase attempts to reduce existing resistance as necessary. Contrary to some marketing techniques there are methods that may prove to be problematic for the JFC.

A technique that the JFC may want to be wary of is the testing of messages in only one specific area. This is much like a marketing firm would only market a product in one city. The danger of this technique is that the information environment is not a closed system, messages and themes in one location

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<sup>118</sup> Military diplomacy is “the ability to support those activities and measures US military leaders take to engage military, defense and government officials of another country to communicate USG policies and messages and build defense and coalition relationships.” CJCSM 3122.03C, *Joint Operational Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning Formats* (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 17 August 2007).

will easily make it into to another to be interpreted in a variety of ways. This phenomenon is principally enabled by internet transparency. To acknowledge these and other events, the JFC should establish a relatively robust information and media monitoring capability that is part of the operations center existing in the command.

If resources are limited, reorientation of traditional current operations functions may be warranted toward an acknowledgment of the importance of information and the cyber medium. This information operations monitoring function should be an integral part of the existing current operations infrastructure that can acknowledge and execute contingency plans and collect assessment data. These processes should be linked to all of the operations the JFC undertakes. To help fuse interagency efforts this function should not only be linked into the traditional JFC command hierarchy of the National Command Authority but also tied directly into the Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center, the Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and it's three bureaus: International Information Programs, Educational and Cultural Affairs, and Public Affairs.<sup>119</sup>

At the end of the day, adaptive changes across the JFCs strategic communication activities will remain a viable endeavor for future research. Trends in approach and the application of technology will continue to evolve as the information environment forces the JFC to adapt their communication tactics, techniques and procedures. Yet, a fundamental strategy designed to influence targeted audiences by reducing their resistance to an idea will remain not only relevant but essential well into the future.

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<sup>119</sup> The United States Department of State Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs “leads America’s diplomatic outreach which includes communications with international audiences, cultural programming, academic grants, educational exchanges, international visitor programs, and U.S. Government efforts to confront ideological support for terrorism. The Under Secretary oversees the bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Public Affairs and International Information Programs, and participates in foreign policy development.” See <http://www.state.gov/r/> (accessed February 28, 2010).

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